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Twenty Years of ‘Law and Finance’:  
Time to Take Law Seriously 
 
 
Gerhard Schnyder, Loughborough University, London, UK 
Mathias Siems, Durham University, UK 
Ruth Aguilera, Northeastern University, USA 
 
ABSTRACT 
This ‘state of the art’ essay provides a comprehensive discussion of the Law and Finance 
School (LFS) literature. We show that the first two decades of the LFS have focused on em-
pirically investigating the question ‘does law matter?’ Yet, despite the centrality of law to the 
LFS, it is based on an incoherent theory of law, which leads to shortcomings in the conceptu-
alisation and empirical testing of its hypotheses. We also observe that, rather than addressing 
this deficiency, the LFS has moved its focus to the contentious concept of ‘legal origin.’ We 
argue that the LFS needs to take law more seriously by returning to its initial focus on the 
substance of legal rules and by addressing the theoretical question ‘how does law matter?’ 
We propose venues for future research to develop a solid theoretical framework that would 
put the empirical investigation of law’s impact on economic outcomes on a more solid foot-












Over the last twenty years, the so-called Law and Finance School (hereinafter LFS) 
has become an important stream of research in management and socio-economic studies. The 
LFS departs from a series of articles co-authored by Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-
Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert Vishny in 1997 (La Porta et al. 1997). At the academic 
level, the LFS is part of a broader trend of rediscovery since the 1980s of the importance of 
institutions in determining economic outcomes not just in economics (North 1990; Acemoglu 
and Robinson 2012), but also in political science (Hall and Taylor 1996), and organisation 
studies (DiMaggio and Powell 1984).  
The influence of this school both in academia and economic policy can hardly be 
overstated. For instance, Schiehll and Martins’ (2016) review shows that the two main ex-
planatory variables from the LFS, ‘legal origin’ and the quality of law in terms of ‘investor 
protection,’ are by far the most common country-level factors used as independent variables 
in cross-country governance research in political economy, management, economics, and fi-
nance. Specifically, these two explanatory variables are widely used in empirical studies in 
various fields not only to explain patterns of corporate finance, ownership, and control struc-
tures (Volmer et al. 2007; Bedu and Montalban 2013; Colli 2013; Callaghan 2015; Lehrer 
and Celo 2016), but also public administration regimes (Tepe et al. 2010), features of national 
labour markets (Schneider and Karcher 2010; Emmenegger and Marx 2011; Darcillon 2015; 
all citing Botero et al. 2004), the nature and size of the informal sector (Adriaenssen and Hen-
drickx 2015), and more generally institutionalised trust (Witt and Redding 2013; Huo 2014; 
citing La Porta et al. 1998 and 2000). Thus, the LFS has become the dominant legal approach 
not only in comparative economics, but also in comparative management, international busi-
ness and corporate governance research (for overviews see Jackson and Deeg 2008; Aguilera 
and Jackson 2010; Schiehll and Martins 2016).  
However, despite its extraordinary influence, the LFS has also come under a great 
deal of criticism. Scholars have documented biases in the selection of legal variables, inaccu-
rate and not rigorous coding of laws and endogeneity problems (e.g., Milhaupt and Pistor 
2008; Aguilera and Williams 2009; Armour et al. 2009a; Spamann 2010). Another prominent 
line of criticism points out that the LFS exaggerates the importance of law and neglects the 
influence of other factors – such as history and politics – on corporate governance and fi-




Contrary to these well-known criticisms, we argue, based on a comprehensive review 
of the first twenty years of LSF scholarship, that the LFS’s challenge is not that it takes law 
too seriously, but that, conceptually, it does not take law seriously enough. Indeed, possibly 
reacting to criticisms, the LFS has increasingly broadened the definition of ‘law’, retracting 
somewhat from the original claim that the substantive aspects of a country’s laws matter for 
corporate governance and financial development. Instead, differences in enforcement as well 
as other broad features of a country’s legal, political, and even ‘ideological’ system captured 
by their notion of ‘legal origin’ are considered the underlying explanatory factors (cf. e.g. La 
Porta et al. 2006 and 2008). Moreover, the definition of ‘legal origin’ has shifted from a nar-
row statement about the rooting of a country’s law in one of four legal families to a much 
broader definition of a country’s ‘style of social control’ of the economy (La Porta et al. 
2008). As a result, the importance of the actual substance of the law – prominent in the earlier 
studies – has become relegated to the background.  
Our systematic review unveils that the LFS, despite two decades of research confi-
dently claiming that ‘law matters,’ fails to have a clear theoretical understanding about the 
impact of law on economic outcomes. It draws on various strands of legal scholarship yet ig-
nores the critical fact that different legal theories offer at times contradictory arguments of 
how law deploys its impact on actors. Thus, as we will show, many LFS studies clearly adopt 
a position close to the ‘coercive theory of law’ where the threat of punishment is the only mo-
tivation for actors to obey the law. Yet, the LFS’s empirical strategy is to investigate the im-
pact of law on economic outcomes that are not directly targeted by the law in question. This 
is consistent with a normative theory of law – where law motivates actors by signalling ap-
propriate behaviour – but not with the coercive theory. Similarly, as we will elaborate, the 
LFS explicitly adheres to a customary-evolutionary view of the law that stresses the need for 
organically grown and community-based legal rules, while explicitly advocating the funda-
mentally incompatible point of instrumentally using law and legal transplants for economic 
reform. 
These are more than aesthetic flaws in the LFS’s theoretical underpinnings as they af-
fect the empirical application of the LFS thesis. Indeed, there is a tendency amongst empiri-
cally orientated scholars to underestimate the importance of theory (Deaton and Cartwright, 
2010). This unfortunately leads to operationalise variables and specify statistical models in 
ways that are inconsistent across studies and not grounded in solid theoretical claims 
(Schiehll and Martins 2016). We argue that this oversight of legal theory greatly limits the 
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potential of the LFS to contribute to our understanding of the role of law in the economy. For 
this purpose, we assess the theoretical claims contained implicitly or explicitly in the LFS 
studies against key conceptual dimensions that we derive from several established theories of 
law in order to answer the question: What theoretical assumptions regarding the nature, func-
tion, validity, and impact of law on economic outcomes inform the LFS research programme?  
This review article proceeds as follows: Section 2 sets the scene by summarising the 
key claims and empirical findings of the first twenty years of LFS studies and outlines differ-
ent theories of law and their key dimensions. On this basis, Sections 3 to 5 analyse what the 
LFS literature has to say about what law is, what good law is, and how law impacts economic 
actors’ behaviour. Section 6 concludes with a discussion of the implications of our findings. 
We advocate that future research should not abandon the investigation of how substantive 
differences in laws affect different economic outcomes. Rather, we propose to develop a 
more solid theoretical framework, which is unequivocal about the key assumptions regarding 
the role of law in the economy. We argue that this framework includes as a minimum explic-
itly conceptualising three dimensions of law: the law’s nature and primary function; its neces-
sary content (if any) and its relationship with morals; and how it deploys its behavioural ef-
fects on law-takers. Such a conceptualisation of law will allow researchers to design more ro-
bust empirical tests of whether and how law matters in the economy, addressing thus one of 
the key shortcomings of the first twenty years of Law & Finance research (see Schiehll and 
Martins 2016). 
 
2. Setting the scene 
2.1 Overview of the LFS: Quality of law and legal origins 
We have conducted a comprehensive review of the LFS literature relevant to legal or 
institutional factors. To this effect, we compiled all articles published by the four original au-
thors (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny) since 1997. We excluded articles 
that used legal or institutional factors as mere control variables, including those that focused 
on areas unrelated to socio-economic issues (e.g. Djankov et al. 2010a on disclosure by poli-
ticians). Several articles by other authors were added if considered to be closely related to the 
LFS tradition, because they either co-authored with La Porta et al. (e.g., Edward Glaeser, 
Simeon Djankov, Nicola Gennaioli) or because La Porta et al have repeatedly and approv-
ingly cited their work (e.g., Paul Mahoney, Thorsten Beck, Ross Levine). We also added arti-
cles by scholars who co-authored articles with La Porta et al., but then also authored their 
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own articles in the LFS tradition. Overall, we reviewed 56 articles published between 1997 
and 2017, which we consider to constitute the core of the LFS (see Table 2 in the Appendix).1 
The majority of them are empirical studies, while thirteen are theoretical, and one is a review 
paper. 
Starting from the LFS’s fundamental assumption that ‘law matters’ for economic out-
comes, the early LFS publications developed two key claims: firstly, that the ‘quality’ – de-
fined in terms of the strength of minority shareholder protection – of a country’s company 
law determines key features of companies’ and countries’ corporate governance systems, 
such as ownership concentration, corporate finance choices, and the size of countries’ stock 
markets (e.g. La Porta et al. 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000). This implies that law also impacts eco-
nomic growth by favouring companies’ growth prospects (Levine 1999; Beck et al. 2000; 
Claessens and Laeven 2003). Secondly, the LFS claims that the quality of law is not ran-
domly distributed across countries, but rather is a function of the country’s ‘legal origin’ in 
either common law, or different families of civil law (La Porta et al. 1997 among others).  
The first of these claims is often referred to as the ‘quality of law’ (Armour et al. 
2009a) or ‘law matters’ thesis (Deakin et al. 2011), which explains economic outcomes based 
on substantive features of a country’s company law such as the level of property right protec-
tion (e.g. La Porta et al. 1997). However, rather quickly, the focus of the LFS shifted from 
measuring the substantive quality of different laws – and indeed law per se – to the second 
claim, namely that economic outcomes are determined by more fundamental historically-
grown features of a country’s legal and political system.  
The LFS distinguishes four different ‘legal origins’ based on the grounding of coun-
tries’ laws in four ‘mother systems’: English Common Law, French-, German-, or Scandina-
vian Civil Law. According to the LFS, these legal origins reflect or highly correlate with 
more fundamental differences between common law countries and other legal systems. For 
example, La Porta et al. (2008: 303, fn 12) initially express the view ‘that legal origin theory 
is intimately related to the discussion of the varieties of capitalism,’ but then also suggest that 
the notion of legal origins may well replace the one of varieties of capitalism as an ‘objective 
measure of different types’ of economic systems. 
                                                          
1 Conversely, we did not review the vast empirical literature that applies or empirically tests the LFS concepts 
because such empirical studies do often not contain any theoretical development about the role of law and legal 
origin in the economy, but simply refer to the respective LFS articles (Schiehll and Martins 2016 provides a partial 
review of that literature).  
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Contrary to the narrow concept of ‘legal quality,’ ‘legal origins’ evolved into a more 
encompassing and even philosophical category distinguishing types of countries. Thus, Ma-
honey (2001: 511) claims that the difference boils down to common law countries defining 
‘liberty’ based on the Humian-Lockian tradition as individual liberty, while civil law coun-
tries follow the Hobbesian-Rousseauist tradition of seeking to achieve liberty through collec-
tive goals pursued by the state. This, in turn, implies that the ‘legal origins theory’ is essen-
tially about the level of state intervention in the economy (also La Porta et al. 2008).  
The increasingly broad definition of legal origins also leads the LFS to the verge of 
rather culturalist arguments about the superiority of certain civilisations over others: La Porta 
et al. (1997b: 333) essentially suggest that Catholicism and Islam are inferior to Protestantism 
in terms of economic outcomes because these civilizations prevent the emergence of ‘hori-
zontal trust’ among citizens. In fact, La Porta et al. (2004: 445) explicitly state that there are 
‘significant benefits of the Anglo-American system of government for freedom.’ 
Despite this shift from the substance of legal rules to ‘legal origins’ in the scholarly 
LFS literature, practitioners in international financial institutions continue to develop reform 
programmes and policy advice that draw on the LFS’s original focus on legal reform as prime 
means of economic development. Thus, the World Bank’s Doing Business Reports (DBRs), 
annually updated since 2004, directly draw on the LFS regarding shareholder and creditor 
protection, while extending its logic to legal rules related to taxation, electricity, construction 
permits, cross-border trade and public procurement (The World Bank 2004-2017). The DBRs 
also provide country rankings on various dimensions. While common law countries top most 
of these rankings, civil law countries have implemented reforms that saw them rise in these 
rankings. However, it has recently been shown that these improvements in the rankings did 
not lead to improvements in the countries’ real economy (Oto-Peralías and Romero-Ávila 
2017). Therefore, the link between legal reform and economic outcomes seems tenuous de-
spite two decades of intensive LFS research. Below, we will argue that this is at least partly 
due to a lack of coherent theorisation of the role of law. 
In the next sub-section, we review the empirical findings regarding the legal variables 
defined by the LFS and economic outcomes in more detail. 
2.2 Empirical Findings of 20 years of LFS 
Most of the attention of LFS scholars as well as the extensive scholarship criticising 
the approach has focused on the empirical side, including issues of measurement (Spamann 
2010; Schnyder 2012), methodologies (Deakin et al. 2011), and interpretation of findings 
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(Deakin et al. 2018). In this section, we briefly review the empirical findings of the first 
twenty years of the LFS (see also the final column of Table 2 in the Appendix). 
A first observation concerns the empirical implications of the above-mentioned 
change in the main legal variables used in the LFS studies from ‘quality of law’ to ‘legal 
origin.’ The earliest studies focussed on substantive legal rules on minority shareholder pro-
tection, such as the one-share, one vote rule and the so-called Anti-Director Rights Index 
(ADRI) (La Porta et al. 1997). ‘Legal origin’ was merely used as an instrument variable to 
control for endogeneity. Yet, over the next years, legal origins evolved into an explanatory 
variable in its own right and – in a process of ‘conceptual stretching’ (Sartori 1970) – became 
increasingly broadly defined. Thus, while the earliest studies defined legal origins simply as 
the origin of the country’s commercial law in one of four legal families, by 2008, La Porta et 
al. (2008: 286) define legal origins ‘as a style of social control of economic life (and maybe 
of other aspects of life as well).’ This broad definition of legal origins as ‘regulatory style’ is 
used as a catch-all category that covers many aspects of what La Porta et al. (2008: 308) call 
‘legal infrastructure,’ including ideology and culture. Contrary to the substantive aspects of 
law, legal origins are considered to be less malleable and more stable over time (Deakin et al. 
2011). In spite of its vagueness, it is legal origins – broadly defined – that has increasingly 
become the main focus of LFS studies, while substantive legal rules are relegated to the role 
of intermediary variables that are more malleable than the legal infrastructure but ultimately 
just epiphenomenal to legal origin. Thus, in a review of the first ten years of their main stud-
ies, La Porta et al. (2008: 292) list the following – broadly legal or political – intermediary 
variables that are explained by legal origins and in turn explain a range of economic out-
comes: (i) procedural formalism, (ii) judicial independence, (iii) regulation of entry, (iv) gov-
ernment ownership of the media, (v) labour laws, (vi) conscription, (vii) company law, (viii) 
securities law, (ix) bankruptcy law, and (x) government ownership of banks. 
In parallel, the dependent variables also become increasingly broad and varied. The 
initial focus was on investigating the impact of legal factors on economic outcomes. The 
main claim of the LFS was that the level of legal minority shareholder and creditor protection 
influences the financial development of a country (La Porta et al. 1998), which in turn has 
been shown to be linked to higher economic growth rates (cf. Levine 1999; Beck et al. 2000) 
and political and economic freedom (La Porta et al. 2004). Financial development was prox-
ied by variables such as the overall stock market capitalisation divided by GDP, the value of 
stock traded to GDP, the number of listed firms as a proportion of the country’s population, 
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the number of initial public offerings as a proportion of the size of the economy, and the con-
centration of firm ownership (La Porta et al. 2008; Djankov et al. 2008). The range of politi-
cal and economic outcomes explained by legal variables progressively increased. The ten-
year review paper by La Porta et al. (2008: 292) states that legal aspects were shown to ex-
plain a large number of economic outcomes such as the control premium on sales of blocks of 
shares, private credit, interest rate spread, labour market participation rates, unemployment 
levels, corruption, the size of the unofficial economy, the time to evict a non-paying tenant, 
and the time to collect a bounced check. 
Since this seminal 2008 article, the LFS has further broadened its scope by succes-
sively adding new aspects of a country’s legal system to the explanatory model and applying 
this model to new outcome variables. Thus, Djankov et al. (2010) find an impact of tax law 
on investment and level of entrepreneurship. La Porta and Shleifer (2014) uncover evidence 
for cost of compliance with law on the size of the informal sector. Djankov et al. (2016) turn 
to the perception of the quality of government to explain Eastern European peoples’ happi-
ness. Moreover, while the LFS abstained for a long time from directly investigating GDP 
growth rates (Djankov et al. 2008; Deakin et al. 2011), a few studies progressively shifted to-
wards more general measures of economic development including the impact of tax law on 
FDI, investment, and entrepreneurship (Djankov et al. 2010b), and the impact of legal trade 
restrictions on the volume of trade (Djankov et al. 2010c), regional income level conver-
gence, and growth (Gennaioli et al. 2014). 
A second stream of empirical studies developed in parallel, and took in legal factors 
as dependent variables. These studies investigate the impact of legal origins or societal char-
acteristics (e.g. prevailing religion, level of trust in a society) on the shape and form of regu-
latory and judicial systems. They focus on variables such as the demand for state intervention 
and regulation (Aghion et al. 2010), the level of legal formalism (Balas et al. 2009), judicial 
discretion (Gennaioli and Shleifer 2008), biases in judicial decision making (Bordalo et al. 
2015), perception of lawfulness (Glaeser et al. 2016), regulatory reform (Djankov et al. 
2017). These studies complement the first group by investigating what features of a country 
lead to legal and judicial systems yielding superior economic outcomes.  
The core LFS studies generally finds that in all these areas and regardless of the legal 
measure used, aspects of the legal and judicial system associated with the ‘common law’ tra-
dition produce ‘better’ outcomes than those associated with ‘civil law’ countries (Djankov et 
al. 2008). However, this claim is contested by authors not associated with the LFS who use 
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their legal variables and coding in comparative studies. For example, a meta-analysis that in-
vestigated the use of LFS variables in comparative corporate governance research finds that 
‘[a]lthough there is consistent evidence that investor protection has a fundamental effect on 
financial market development and firm ownership structure, its effect on the use of other 
firm-level governance mechanisms or their effectiveness is less convincing’ (Schiehll and 
Martins 2016: 189).  
Others have gone beyond using LFS own measures in their empirical research. In-
stead, they revisit the LFS findings based on re-coded legal indices (Spamann 2010), differ-
ent statistical methods, and longitudinal rather than cross-sectional data (Deakin et al. 2018). 
In general, these studies uncover findings that are much less consistent with the LFS claims 
about the impact of law on economic outcomes and in particular about the superiority of 
common law over civil law. 
We join these critics in arguing that one reasons for the discrepancies and lack of ro-
bustness in empirical findings has to do with the weak theorisation of the legal factors in the 
LFS. Thus, Schiehll and Martins (2016: 189) note a ‘wide variation’ in the operationalisation 
and interpretation of the LFS legal measures used in comparative studies. They conclude that 
a rigorous and globally relevant understanding of comparative corporate governance requires 
‘a more conscientious match between theorized associations and empirical tests’ (Schiehll 
and Martins 2016: 195). Similarly, Deakin et al. (2011: 3) state that the absence of clear evi-
dence for a direct link between legal origin and economic outcomes such as GDP growth sug-
gests that ‘there are aspects of the relationship between the legal system and national eco-
nomic performance which have yet to be unravelled.’ 
In this respect, moving from a focus on substantive features of law (the quality of law) 
towards much broader factors (legal origins) has led the LFS to dodge the theoretical question 
of the role of law in the economy, rather than to contribute to answering it. This is an unfortu-
nate development, because it diverts our attention away from the key challenge of showing 
not just that law matters, but also how it matters. Rather than continuing the debate about le-
gal origins (e.g. Oto-Peralías and Romero-Ávila 2017; Deakin et al. 2017b; Deakin and Pistor 
2012; Siems 2007), we pledge that the LFS needs to renew its initial ambition to investigate 
the impact of legal rules on economic practices and outcomes.  
As an important first step, we revisit the often-neglected weaknesses in the theoretical 
assumptions about law underpinning the LFS. We investigate this question by drawing on 
five classical legal theories to assess what the LFS has to say about law and to suggest ways 
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in which future research can develop a more solid theory of the role of law in the economy. 
This, we argue, would make the empirical application of the LFS more robust and is therefore 
a key area for future research. 
2.3 Overview of different theories of law and their key dimensions 
Legal theory is a vast area of research. Therefore, we selected the most relevant theo-
ries based on our aim to relate them to the LFS. Since the LFS emerged in the US in the late 
20th century, we focus on modern Western and mainly Anglo-Saxon legal theories and ne-
glect non-Western approaches to the law which are very unlikely to have constituted the basis 
for the LFS. In this regard, we follow Tamanaha’s (2017) insight that theories of law have to 
be understood within the specific social context in which they have emerged.  
Specifically, we focus on the following five theories of law, which have played a cru-
cial role in Western scholarship and practice: natural law theory, exclusive/strong legal posi-
tivism, inclusive/weak legal positivism, legal realism, and Hayek’s functional-evolutionary 
spontaneous order theory of law. Based on our reading of these legal theories, we identify 
three key dimensions that are necessary to theoretically fully define the concept of law: the 
‘nature and primary function of law’, the ‘content of law,’ and the ‘behavioural effect of law’.  
 
------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here  
------------------------- 
 
Table 1 illustrates the opposing views of legal theories as well as the linkages between 
the three dimensions. The table also presents an initial comparison with the general position 
of the LFS.  In each of the following three sections, we first discuss where the LFS falls rela-
tive to each dimension of legal theories in more detail (sections 3.1, 4.1, and 5.1 below) and 
subsequently we offer suggestions regarding where future LFS research should focus its at-
tention in order to ‘take law seriously’ (sections 3.2, 4.2 and 4.3 below). 
 
3. Dimension 1: Nature and primary function of law  
The term ‘nature of law’ is the most basic dimension of any theory of law. It describes 
what type of rule or order is considered as ‘valid law’. In particular, it refers to the source of 
authority for law’s validity. Table 1 summarises the different sources of legal validity, which 
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range from god or nature (in the natural law theory), sovereignty (strong legal positivists), so-
cial convention (weak/inclusive legal positivists), the judge’s rulings (legal realists), to tradi-
tion (evolutionary theory). 
In addition, we use the term ‘primary function of law’ to capture what different legal 
theories see as the fundamental purpose that law fulfils in a society. We call this the primary 
function, because it refers to a more fundamental function than specific laws’ more immedi-
ate functions (such as a road code’s function to prevent accidents). Furthermore, we distin-
guish the primary function of law from the role of law in the sense that the former is not nec-
essarily an empirically verified claim, but rather a theoretical or even normative statement 
about the fundamental purpose of law in society. Conversely, we use ‘role of law’ to describe 
a broader range of empirically verifiable phenomena including the effect of law on actors’ be-
haviours (our third dimension) and on overall economic outcomes.  
3.1 Positioning the LFS towards the nature and primary function of law 
There is no explicit reference to the source of validity of law in the LFS. However, re-
lated to the nature and validity of law, the LFS justifies law – including state law – based on 
its significance for the efficiency of particular outcomes, such as economic growth (see also 
section 2.2 above). This may sound obvious, but starkly contrasts with other streams of Law 
and Economics who – based on the Coase theorem (Coase 1960) – find that optimal solutions 
to allocation problems can usually be found merely based on market forces and private con-
tracts, as long as the contracts are enforceable (Stigler 1964; Fama 1980; Easterbrook and 
Fischel 1991). On this account, no market regulation is required to achieve optimal outcomes; 
tort and contract law will suffice. The LFS on the other hand emphasises the significance of 
laws in general and even supports government regulation under certain conditions (La Porta 
et al. 2000a: 7). For example, Glaeser and Shleifer (2002: 1223) argue that  
‘[e]conomists generally agree that the state’s main role in the economy is to 
protect property rights. […] The trouble with this imperative is that it does not tell 
us exactly how the state can design a functional legal system, and what it takes to 
“protect property rights.”’ 
This insight stems from the fact that the LFS, which Posner (2006: 412) calls the 
‘fourth generation’ of Law and Economics, has shifted its focus towards the international and 
comparative analysis of law. The comparative analysis reveals that, depending on the local 
context, the primary function of law may be a more extensive and benign one than other 
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branches (or generations) of Law and Economics have acknowledged. Therefore, state law is 
not rejected per se; rather, identifying the circumstances under which law is the preferred in-
stitutional choice to protect property rights compared to private contracting is one of the LFS’ 
main goals (see further section 4.2 below, concerning the content of the law).  
We find three interrelated arguments in the LFS literature explaining when state law 
and public enforcement should be preferred to private contracting. First, state law may be 
more efficient than a system of pure private ordering in countries where the general level of 
‘law and order’ is only ‘moderate’ (Glaeser and Shleifer 2003: 403). Second, depending on 
the ‘enforcement environment,’ public enforcement may be a better choice than private litiga-
tion. This is for instance the case when contracts are complex and judges may not have the 
required specialised skills to enforce them (Glaeser and Shleifer 2002; Djankov et al. 2003b: 
605). Third, broad socio-economic factors may affect the choice of the optimal regulatory re-
gime. High economic and political inequality favour the subversion of courts by powerful liti-
gants, leading to a situation where the ‘strong’ not the ‘just’ win court cases (Glaeser and 
Shleifer 2002; Glaeser et al. 2003). 
In other words, the LFS treats the choice of the optimal regulatory regime as an em-
pirical question depending on the ‘enforcement environment’ and other factors, which leaves 
room even for state intervention and regulation. To be sure, state intervention is always a sec-
ond-best solution and the domain of market failures making it necessary is ‘extremely lim-
ited’ (Shleifer 2005: 440; also Glaeser and Shleifer 2003). For example, La Porta et al. (2006) 
find that in securities law, private enforcement is preferred to public enforcement. Still, over-
all, the LFS ascribes to law a more important and potentially more benign function in society 
and the economy than related fields of research such as Posnerian Law and Economics (start-
ing with Posner 1973). 
Regarding the primary function of law, the focus of the LFS is on the protection of 
property rights widely understood (e.g. La Porta et al. 1997: 1149 and 1999: 222; Mahoney 
2001: 523). For instance, the protection of minority shareholder rights through company law 
is necessary because of the risk of expropriation of shareholders by insiders (see Jensen and 
Meckling 1976). In such a situation, the law confers shareholders ‘certain powers to protect 
their investment against expropriation by insiders’ (La Porta et al. 2000b: 3), which in turn 
creates incentives for financiers to make external finance available to companies, leads to 
more developed stock markets, dispersed ownership structures (e.g. La Porta et al. 1997, 
1998, 1999, 2000a) and ultimately faster growing firms (Levine 1999). 
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Milhaupt and Pistor (2008) have criticised the LFS for exclusively focussing on this 
protective function of law. However, some of the LFS articles do contain a somewhat more 
variegated view of the functions of law. For example, Djankov et al. (2003: 596) state that: 
‘Since the days of the Enlightenment, economists have agreed that good 
economic institutions must secure property rights, enabling people to keep the re-
turns on their investment, make contracts, and resolve disputes.’ 
Here, two additional functions of law are mentioned. First, the phrase ‘enabling peo-
ple […] to make contracts’ hints at the enabling or coordinative function of law rather than its 
protective one. This function consists in providing actors with instruments – such as contracts 
– that help them coordinate their economic activities with other actors while negotiating the 
precise allocation of property rights within the boundaries of the law (Milhaupt and Pistor 
2008: 7). Second, solving disputes is a distinct function of law that mainly relates to the laws’ 
enforcement through litigation. The effectiveness of enforcement has also become an increas-
ingly important concern for the LFS and will be discussed in section 5 below. 
3.2 Discussion and suggestions for future research 
It follows from the foregoing analysis that the LFS does not seem to adopt one clear 
definition of the nature and primary function of law. The protective function of law is most 
closely associated with strong legal positivism, in the sense that the latter narrowly defines 
the function of law in terms of preventing misbehaviour by threatening punishment. The ena-
bling function, on the other hand, would suggest a certain proximity of the LFS’ theory of law 
with ‘inclusive positivism,’ because the latter conceives of legal rules not only as dissuading 
citizens from committing harmful actions, but also enabling them to do things they could not 
do without the law (e.g. concluding a contract) (see Table 1). The dispute-solving function, 
on the other hand, is key to ‘legal realism’ which defines law not as what the lawmaker says 
the law is, but what the judge actually enforces in the court of law (see Green 2005, as well as 
Table 1, above). 
While more recent legal scholarship acknowledges that law may simultaneously fulfil 
more than one function (Milhaupt and Pistor 2008), the issue is that the LFS fails to discuss 
the implications for the causal link between law and economic outcomes of the multi-func-
tionality of law that they implicitly acknowledge. Indeed, in the LFS the postulated impact of 
shareholder protection law on economic outcomes (stock market development) is exclusively 
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premised on the protective function. Yet, acknowledging that law also performs other func-
tions (such as the coordinative-enabling function theorised in Hart’s inclusive positivism), the 
postulated causal link between legal rules and economic outcome may not hold anymore. 
This is a serious oversight for a research programme on the impact of law on economic out-
comes and may explain why empirical studies remain inconclusive. Indeed, as Schiehll and 
Martins (2016: 195) argue, the weak empirical evidence for a link between country-level vari-
ables – the most widely-used ones are legal origin and quality of law derived from the LFS – 
and economic outcomes is explained by the fact that ‘country-level variables are conceived 
and applied differently across studies’, therefore calling for a ‘[…] more conscientious match 
between theorized associations and empirical tests’.  
The multiple functions of law also have critical implications for the measurement of 
the legal variables used in the LFS (see further section 5.2, below). Most of the LFS studies 
use simple aggregates of all legal variables, for example, related to shareholder protection, by 
summing up the values of any legal rules that protect shareholders (La Porta et al. 1997). 
However, recent studies suggest that the function of law may not just vary from one context 
to the other, or from one law to the other, but each legal rule may fall into a specific category. 
For example, Katelouzou and Siems (2015) distinguish ‘enabling’ from ‘paternalistic rules’ 
of shareholder protection and establish how preference for one or the other varies across time 
and countries. This latter study (unaffiliated with the LFS) can therefore be seen as an applied 
approach considering different functions of law. It also shows that acknowledging the multi-
functionality of law can require empirical work to account for different types of legal rules, 
for example, by creating sub-indices that show different country preferences for different 
forms and notions of law.  
 
4. Dimension 2: Content of Law 
A second key dimension that distinguishes legal theories is a conception of whether or 
not law needs to have a certain content (either procedural or substantive) in order to be con-
sidered valid. This also relates to the question about laws relationship with morals. Two fun-
damentally opposing views exist. On the one hand, the natural law perspective posits that law 
must respect some extra-legal standards to be considered valid or ‘good’ law. This can be 
based on the notion that certain moral rules and principles (e.g., fairness) are objectively good 
(see for a ‘modern’ statement of this view, Finnis 2011[1980]). On the other hand, a strong 
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legal positivist view simply regards anything the sovereign decides to be law is law, inde-
pendently of its content and form. Other legal theories adopt variations of these two views 
(see Table 1). 
4.1 Positioning the LFS towards the Content of Law 
The LFS rejects legal positivism. La Porta et al. (2008: fn 2) associate legal positivism 
with the socialist legal tradition that conceives of law as the ‘expression of the will of the leg-
islator as supreme interpreter of justice’ (ibid.). Given that socialist legal origin countries tend 
to perform poorly in the empirical studies of the LFS and given the clear preference for de-
centralised over centralisation of political and judicial power (Djankov et al. 2003; Glaeser 
and Shleifer 2002), it follows that legal positivism is not the LFS’s preferred legal theory.  
This is further supported by the LFS’s frequent and extensive borrowing from Hayek 
regarding the customary and evolutionary nature of efficient law (La Porta et al. 1999: 226; 
Mahoney 2001, Shleifer and Wolfenzon 2002; Glaeser and Shleifer 2002: 1220; Djankov et 
al. 2003a: 600; Djankov et al. 2003b: 458; La Porta et al. 2004: 445; Beck et al. 2005: 212) 
and the distinction between law and legislation (Shleifer 2005: 443). Hayek’s writings con-
tain scathing criticisms of legal positivism, with Angner (2007) noting that his theory of law 
can be considered close to the natural law tradition. For example, Hayek (2011[1961]: 224) 
states that ‘[c]ommands that are called law merely because they emanate from a legislator are 
the “chief instrument of oppression” and the chief cause of the decline of liberty.’  
Rejecting positivism and its claim that it is the sovereign who decides without extra-
legal limitation what law is, implies accepting the alternative, non-positivist proposition that 
law must conform with certain extra-legal criteria to be valid. This is supported by the obser-
vation that the LFS extensively uses normative terms like ‘good law’, ‘good governance’, 
‘good government’, ‘improve’, ‘better,’ to characterise legal systems (e.g., La Porta et al., 
1997a: 1194; La Porta et al. 1999: 505; 2000: 6, 20; Glaeser et al. 2003: 272).  
Furthermore, the LFS clearly distinguishes between ‘bad’ (undesirable, harmful) be-
haviours and illegal behaviours, a distinction that hints at the view that extra-legal criteria and 
not just the law determines what is and what is not considered legitimate behaviours. Johnson 
et al. (2000b: fn 1) notes that ‘many forms of stealing are actually legal in countries with 
weak legal environments.’ Similarly, Johnson et al. (2000a: 23) define ‘tunnelling’ as includ-
ing ‘outright theft or fraud, which are illegal everywhere’ and other transactions (e.g., exces-
sive executive compensation), which are not illegal in many countries. Further, Djankov et 
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al.’s (2008) Anti-Self-Dealing Index (ASDI) measures the extent to which minority share-
holders can oppose self-dealing transactions by controlling shareholders where ‘a controlling 
shareholder wants to enrich himself while following the law’ (Djankov et al. 2008: 432; em-
phasis added). 
From a legal positivist view, these statements are outside the domain of law, because 
they refer to extra-legal criteria to judge a given action. Indeed, certain behaviours and trans-
actions are categorised as undesirable (or ‘bad’) even when the positive laws of the country in 
question do not prohibit them. The implication is that ‘theft’, ‘fraud’, etc. have an existence 
independent of the positive law in a given country.  
The question arises on what normative basis the assessment is made that minority 
shareholders ought to have a right to prevent certain transactions. The most explicit pas-
sage is the one by Johnson et al. (2000: 11) stating that in civil law countries ‘[s]elf-deal-
ing transactions are assessed in light of their conformity with statutes and not on the basis 
of their fairness to minorities.’ Therefore, the reason why ‘self-dealing’ is considered in-
herently bad appears is a substantive one, namely that it is incompatible with the general 
principle of ‘fairness to minorities,’ which is independent of what the positive law says. 
The ‘quality’ of a country’s laws is hence assessed against extra-legal standards, which are 
not explicitly part of the country’s positive law (and maybe not even of its social norms). 
The LFS therefore acts on the assumption that laws must conform to certain normative 
principles (such as fairness) to be considered ‘good’ or even valid. Yet, it fails to specify 
from where extra-legal principles such as fairness derive their authority. 
Conversely, another definition of good law in the LFS is based on a non-substantive 
criterion of ‘goodness,’ namely the ease with which a law is enforceable in a given context. 
For example, La Porta et al. (2000a: 22) state that 
‘(…) good legal rules are the ones that a country can enforce. The strategy 
for reform is not to create an ideal set of rules and then see how well they can be 
enforced, but rather to enact the rules that can be enforced within the existing struc-
ture.’ 
Importantly, enforceability is in turn related to the extent to which law reflects the 
community’s customs and standards. Hay and Shleifer (1998), for instance, define ‘good 
rules’ via their social acceptability: ‘good legal rules are those likely to be adopted by private 
parties […] as well as used by courts’ (Hay and Shleifer 1998: 401). The definition of ‘good 
law’ is here – contrary to the substantive claim – a purely pragmatic one (acceptance), which 
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does not presuppose any specific substantive content of legal rules. This hints at an – at times 
explicitly – customary-evolutionary theory of law. Despite the LFS’s strong emphasis on 
state law (see section 3, above), Shleifer (2005: 443) explicitly relativises the role of legisla-
tion compared to custom: 
‘With courts, there is a role for impartial judges enforcing rules of good be-
haviour. These rules do not need to come from legislation, but may instead derive 
from custom or from judge-made common law and precedents.’  
Similarly, Hay and Shleifer (1998: 402) claim, ‘[W]henever possible, laws must agree 
with prevailing practice or custom.’ Indeed, Glaeser and Shleifer (2002: 1202) suggest that 
the reflection of ‘community standards of justice’ in the legal system may be one of the rea-
sons for the alleged superiority of English common law over civil law. 
A final definition of good law in the LFS studies is functionalist and outcome-orien-
tated in nature. For example, La Porta et al. (1999b: 223) explicitly define ‘good’ as what is 
‘good-for-economic-development.’ Similarly, Hay and Shleifer (1998: 401) state in a passage 
defining ‘good law’ that ‘some rules facilitate trade better than others.’ The outcome of facili-
tating trade and economic activity more generally constitutes a criterion for good law. 
In short, there are at least three different definitions of the content of law, as good 
law, in the LFS literature. A first one is narrow and focused on the extent to which law pro-
tects shareholders’ (property) rights, where rights are defined substantively following certain 
principles such as ‘fairness;’ a second one is focused on the efficacy and indeed legitimacy of 
law (in a normative sense)2 with a view to its enforcement and hence effectiveness; a third as-
sesses good law based on the economic outcomes it produces (growth, trade, functioning 
markets etc). 
4.2 Discussion and suggestions for future research 
The LFS does not  explain how these different definitions of good law relate to each 
other. Indeed, analysing these definitions in light of legal theories reveals that they may be 
potentially incompatible. The first, ‘protective’ definition of good law seems closely related 
to natural law theory. Various LFS studies explicitly refer to the long pedigree of the ‘protec-
tive function’ of law, citing Smith (1776), Montesquieu (1748), and Locke (1690) as the main 
sources for the insight that ‘good economic institutions must secure property rights’ (Djankov 
                                                          
2 Normative legitimacy, i.e. justification of power, is to be distinguished from sociological legitimacy, i.e. that 
laws are accepted to be binding, see Green 2013: 489. 
17 
 
et al. 2003a: 596; also Djankov et al. 2003b: 453; Glaeser et al. 2003: 200; 2004: 272; La 
Porta et al. 2004). Several of these classical authors have affinities with natural law theories 
(notably John Locke and Montesquieu; see also Table 1), which may suggest that the LFS 
view accepts certain assumptions of natural law theory. 
The second definition of good law is based on the enforceability of law thanks to its 
proximity to community standards and hence its ‘acceptability’. As mentioned above, this 
also leads to the claim that the supposedly decentralised common law may be superior to the 
allegedly more centralised statute-based civil law. The focus on proximity with community 
standards and on acceptability recalls Hart’s (2012[1961]) ‘practice theory of rules.’ Hart’s 
positivism relies on the assumption that at least some of the rules in a legal system need to be 
‘social rules’ in the sense that they are both commonly practiced and considered legitimate 
guides for action by most in the community. This pragmatic and non-cognitivist view of rules 
(Perry 2006) seems in line with the theory of law that the LFS adopts.  
The customary/procedural definition of good law, as well as the third functionalist 
and outcome-orientated definition, that we found in the LFS can also be related to Hayek’s 
evolutionary-functionalist ‘spontaneous order’ theory of law. Several LFS studies make ex-
plicit reference to Hayek (see above). Djankov et al. (2003: 600) also cite Hayek’s evolution-
ary theory in support of their account of how efficient laws emerge. Hayek (2011[1960]: 115-
6) conceives of law as a ‘spontaneous order’ that crystallises as a result of a process of ‘adap-
tive evolution’ through the survival of the fittest – customary – rules. More specifically, he 
insists on the end-neutrality of any valid law, i.e., law should simply be rules of ‘just conduct’ 
that do not impose duties on individuals, other than obliging them to refrain from interfering 
with other individuals in order to protect their liberty (Hayek 2013[1982]: 200; for Hayek as 
a legal theorist see also Ogus 1989).  
This is broadly compatible with the LFS’s theory of law. That is, it is in line with its 
narrow definition of the quality of legal rules in terms of the protection they afford individu-
als against other individuals and against the state (Djankov et al. 2003a). At the same time, in 
different places, it becomes clear that Hayek supports a substantive definition of valid law, 
namely that its function is to favour markets and trade (Santos 2006). This is compatible with 
the LFS’s third definition of good law (conduciveness to trade and markets). The association 
between the LFS and the Hayekian theory of law seems hence close.  
However, even in its use of the Hayekian theory the LFS is not always consistent. 
Hayek considers the evolutionary theory of law to be incompatible with an instrumental use 
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of law by the state to achieve specific collective goals. Such an instrumental use is the result 
of an erroneous naivety of ‘rational constructivism’ and ‘pragmatism’ (Hayek 2011[1960]). 
The LFS, on the other hand, contains a clear utilitarian, instrumentalist, and ultimately teleo-
logical slant, notably regarding the feasibility and desirability of legal reform (e.g., Hay and 
Shleifer 1998). As a result, the LFS notion of efficiency or optimality of a regulatory regime 
differs from Hayek’s. For instance, Glaeser and Shleifer (2002) and Djankov et al. (2003) 
consider the rise of the statute-based regulatory state in the US during the progressive era and 
the relative decline of a purely court-based private litigation system, as an efficient adaptation 
to a new, more complex economic and social environment. Hayek (2011[1960]; chapter 16) 
on the other hand saw this evolution as part of the regrettable ‘decline of the rule of law,’ due 
to the rise of ‘constructivist pragmatism’ and socialism, which once again hints at the LFS’s 
more benign view of regulations compared to economic liberals. 
It follows that the LFS’s inconsistent and contradictory conceptualisation of law and 
its content is more than a concern for legal theorists but has very concrete implications for the 
validity of their empirical studies. Notably it can be seen that some of the LFS’s empirical 
tools do not reflect any of these definitions. Their use of a universal one-size-fits-all coding 
template of the black letter law (see previous sub-section) pays no attention to community 
standards and effective enforcement. Correspondingly, it has been found that much of the 
LFS templates are simply based on the existing rules of US law, regardless of whether the US 
model really represents standards of ‘good law’. For example, this US bias has been evi-
denced in empirical studies by Lele and Siems (2007) and Deakin et al. (2017b) (both unaffil-
iated with the LFS) which have applied alternative forms of legal measurement for the 
strength of shareholder protection and creditor rights.  
We therefore suggest that future empirical research on law and finance needs to start 
with an explicit discussion of how ‘good law’ can be defined for a particular research ques-
tion. Different projects can justify the use of different definitions. Indeed, researchers may 
aim to test which type of rules may have the desired characteristics or effects to be considered 
‘good law’. For example, in response to the example mentioned in the previous paragraph, it 
may be tested whether US company law is the most promising international model, say, be-
cause it may attract US investors, or whether other means of shareholder protection can have 
the same effect. Consequently, taking theory seriously will allow researchers to develop 




5. Dimension 3: Behavioural Effect of Law 
The two previous dimensions assume that law ‘matters’ but they do not specify the 
precise mechanisms through which law guides actors’ behaviours. Thus, this ‘behavioural ef-
fect’ of law designates the immediate effect of law on its subjects and is hence distinct from 
its impact on broader socio-economic outcomes (such as the development of stock markets, 
see section 2.2, above). Here, legal theories can essentially be divided into two groups (see 
Table 1): those that consider that law provides people with objective reasons to obey (moral 
obligation and practical reason) and focus hence on the normativity of law; and those that 
only consider subjective reasons for action (self-interest, fear of punishment, habit of obedi-
ence). This section seeks to identify the mechanisms that the LFS postulates and to which 
theory of law it corresponds most closely. 
5.1 Positioning the LFS towards the Behavioural Effect of Law 
A first observation is that there is no explicit discussion in the LFS of how exactly law 
makes actors do what it prescribes. However, there are some broad references to the incen-
tives that law creates for different actors and influences their behaviour (e.g., La Porta et al. 
1997, 1998). Incentives are the domain of rational calculation of the costs and benefits of 
(non-)compliance by self-interested actors and hence a ‘subjectivist’ explanation of the be-
havioural effect of law. The LFS therefore adopts an anthropology where actors do not follow 
the law for the sake of following it, but to avoid sanctioning. It is hardly surprising that the 
LFS would lean toward the subjectivist explanation, given that it draws on theories such as 
agency theory that are grounded in rational choice paradigm (e.g., the LFS studies of investor 
protection; see section 2.1, above). Such theories are in turn based on the homo oeconomicus 
‘model of man’ who in their pursuit of maximal utility is not responsive to norms and duties, 
but only to cost-benefit considerations and incentives. 
Several statements illustrate this point. Gleaser et al. (2003: 201) quite explicitly 
claim that the only reason why powerful actors would respect the law is the fear for sanc-
tions: ‘If the politically strong expect to prevail in any court case brought against them, they 
would not respect the property rights of others’ (also Glaeser et al. 2001). Shleifer and Wolf-
enzon (2002) attempt to combine Becker’s (1968) economic model of crime with Jensen and 
Meckling’s (1976) agency theory. Accordingly, they define the quality of investor protection 
not through a list of legal shareholder rights, but as ‘likelihood that the entrepreneur is caught 
and fined for expropriating from shareholders’ (Shleifer and Wolfenzon 2002: 4).  
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This line of argument is remarkably close to Holmes’s (1897) legal realist ‘prediction 
theory of law’ according to which law should be defined simply as the prediction of what the 
likelihood of sanctions will be (see Green 2005). In Holmes’s famous words: ‘If you want to 
know the law and nothing else, you must look at it as a bad man, who cares only for the mate-
rial consequences which such knowledge enables him to predict’ (Holmes 1897: 459). The 
proximity of modern economics’ homo oeconomicus and the legal realist ‘bad man’ is re-
markable and may explain why the LFS has been increasingly drawn towards this theory of 
law. 
Indeed, since around 2007 we observe a ‘legal realist turn’ in the LFS. A series of ar-
ticles of the LFS explicitly adopt a legal realist view (Gennaioli and Shleifer 2007a, 2007b, 
but also Balas et al. 2009; Niblett et al. 2010; Gennaioli et al. 2014). A key tenant of the real-
ist position is the so-called ‘decision theory’ of law, which argues that law is what the judge 
decides not what the legislator says it is. Therefore, the LFS analyses adjudication in common 
law countries in detail, focussing on questions about the application of legal rules by judges--
including their decisional biases, the role of precedents, ‘overruling’, ‘distinguishing’, and 
discretion in fact finding (Gennaioli and Shleifer 2007a, 2007b, 2008; Niblett et al. 2010). 
The omission of objective reasons to obey the law may explain the LFS’s strong focus 
on law enforcement (see Milhaupt and Pistor 2008: 5). Indeed, for the ‘bad man,’ without en-
forcement – or at least a credible threat of it –, there is no reason to obey the law. In the LFS, 
enforcement was initially only reflected in a ‘rule of law’ control variable (La Porta et al., 
1997, 1998). Yet, subsequent studies developed the analysis of enforcement much further. 
Thus, La Porta et al. (1999) analysed the quality of government and its impact on enforce-
ment. Later studies focussed on more specific factors such as the competence and incentives 
of judges (Glaeser et al. 2001; Glaeser and Shleifer 2002; Djankov et al. 2003b) and the de-
gree of subversion of courts by particular interests (Glaeser et al. 2003; Glaeser and Shleifer 
2003). Shleifer (2005: 442) even calls his approach to regulation an ‘enforcement theory of 
regulation,’ because the ‘enforcement environment’ determines the optimal system of social 
control of the economy between the two extremes of a purely court-based litigation system 
and public regulation. 
5.2 Discussion and suggestions for future research 
The previous subsection has shown that the LFS increasingly takes a legal realist 
stance of focussing on the importance of enforcement of the law. In this regard, it also shares 
its position with the strong positivist ‘coercive view’ i.e. that the threat or anticipation of 
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sanctions is the main motivation for people to obey the law (going back to Austin 1832). 
However, the strong positivist/realist view of the mechanisms through which law deploys its 
effects contradicts both the rejection of positivism regarding the source of valid law and the 
previously established proximity of the LFS with Hayek’s theory of law (see section 4) as 
Hayek considered that habit and tradition were what drives compliance with law, while coer-
cion only was a last resort (Hayek 2011[1961], chapter 9).3 
More generally, the LFS’s focus on subjectivist explanations of the behavioural effect 
of law leads it to neglect any other behavioural effects of the law, in particular normative 
ones. This makes the LFS theory of law incompatible with theories that are based on the no-
tion that law creates ‘objective reasons for action’ (Table 1, column 7). Thus, the Beckerian-
Holmesian view of human motivation starkly contrasts with Hart’s theory, which is based on 
the law-abiding citizen rather than the ‘bad man’ (Hart 2012[1961]: 40). Hart observed that 
most citizens consider it their duty to obey the law for the sake of obeying the law, rather than 
as the result of a conscious calculation of costs and benefits associated with the likelihood of 
sanctions. 
The omission of objective reasons for compliance is more than a theoretical issue as it 
may lead to miss-specify  empirical research designs and related statistical models. Thus, the 
numerous studies that empirically investigate shareholder protection have exclusively fo-
cused on the incentives that investors have to invest or refrain from investing in stock due to 
effective protection of their property rights or the absence thereof. While this is certainly part 
of the story, this conceptualisation disregards the other main addressees of legal rules on 
shareholder protection, namely the ‘insiders’ (directors, managers and blockholders) who are, 
according to agency theory, the ones doing the expropriating. The LFS assumes that insiders 
comply with legal rules of shareholder protection due to the fear of sanctions. 
However, this may not be the only channel through which law deploys its effect on 
economic actors. For example, company law may reflect prevalent ethical standards which 
are mediated through market forces. As such, law may work through a signalling effect that 
invokes actors’ moral dispositions by signalling the appropriate behaviour. The strength of 
this effect may be quite independent of enforcement (cf. Deakin et al. 2017a; for the way reg-
ulation affects corporate governance; see also Aguilera et al. 2013). 
                                                          
3 This idea also resonates with Max Weber (1968[1921]: 81) who argued that the public’s belief in the legiti-
macy of the law is crucial as the state is unlikely to be able to enforce all violations of the law by force. 
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Neglecting these theoretical limitations is not just an aesthetic flaw, but leads to mis-
conceptions and misspecification of empirical research designed to test law and finance hy-
potheses. This can be seen in studies that use general measures of legal minority shareholder 
protection, such as the Anti-Director Rights Index (ADRI) and the Anti-Self-Dealing Index 
(ASDI), regardless of whether it contains any legal rules directly affecting the practices under 
investigation. For example, Schneper and Guillen (2004) use the ADRI to investigate the im-
pact of law on hostile takeover activity, although this legal measure does not contain any 
rules on hostile takeovers. Similarly, Cuomo et al. (2012) investigate the link between legal 
reforms and companies’ corporate governance practices in Italy. They use the ADRI and 
other country-level measure of legal shareholder protection, but do not focus on the same as-
pects of corporate governance as dependent firm-level variables as the ADRI does not con-
tain any measures for ownership structures, the existence of pyramid structures, or syndicate 
agreements among shareholders, which are the control-enhancing mechanisms the study aims 
to investigate.   
Strictly speaking, such studies are therefore incompatible with the coercive view of 
law, which would suggest a relative limited impact of law on corporate practices. That is, if 
threat of punishment is the only motivation actors have to follow the law, ceteris paribus, le-
gal change would only lead to change in a corporate practice if it is directly targeted by the 
legal change in question. Consequently, if the coercive effect were the only effect of legal 
rules on corporate practices, empirical studies should focus on investigating the direct corre-
spondence between legal variables and firm-level variables. Surprisingly, however, very few 
studies adopt this empirical strategy corresponding to their implicit conceptualisation of legal 
rules, as coercive and authoritative orders. This illustrates the mismatch between the implicit 
assumptions about how law is expected to matter, and the empirical procedure used to test 
whether law matters (for a similar point see Schiehll and Martins 2016). 
It follows from the foregoing analysis that future LFS research needs to understand 
more fully how law guides actors’ behaviour. The rich literature on behavioural law and eco-
nomics (Zamir and Teichman 2014; Mathis 2015) may be particularly suitable to achieve 
this. In addition, Friedman (2016) rightly points out that the way law affects behaviour is a 
cross-disciplinary topic with extensive research in political science, sociology, economics, 
criminology, law, and psychology. Similarly, socio-legal and regulatory studies show that 
modern states combine different types of regulatory tools – including laws – that deploy their 
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impact on the ‘law takers’ in ways that are different from the Austinian ‘command-and-con-
trol’ idea (Schneiberg and Bartley 2008). It is hence doubtful that the narrow focus on sanc-
tions, enforcement, and rational utility maximisation appropriately captures the way in which 
law impacts economic actors. This is where future LFS studies can make great contributions. 
 
6. Conclusion 
In this essay, we review the first twenty years of the so-called Law and Finance 
School (LFS) literature. We show that the focus of this literature has been mostly on investi-
gating the empirical link between different legal variables and an increasingly broad set of 
economic, social, and political outcome variables with a view to answer the question ‘does 
law matter?’ Yet, beyond the large body of empirical work, the development of a coherent 
theory of law to underpin the empirical efforts has been largely neglected.  
Our critical review constitutes the first study analysing in detail the legal theoretical 
assumptions underlying LFS studies. Drawing on concepts from five of the most influential 
Western legal theories as a benchmark, we reach the surprising conclusion that the LFS actu-
ally has very little to say about what law is and how it affects economic actors and outcomes. 
Indeed, the LFS mostly applies economic theory and econometric methods to legal phenom-
ena rather than the other way around. Our analysis does reveal certain recurring themes that 
constitute an embryo of legal theory in the LFS, yet, this theoretical understanding is tenta-
tive, underdeveloped, and at times contradictory. 
The key question that arises from this observation however is: do these theoretical 
shortcomings matter? Is it not sufficient for a theory in the area of applied economics to cor-
rectly predict the outcomes of interest (cf. Friedman 1966[1953])? These questions are rele-
vant because the LFS has been challenged not just on theoretical, but also on empirical 
grounds. The predictive power of the theory does not seem anywhere near as strong as it may 
appear based on the popularity of the theory (e.g. Aguilera and Williams, 2009; Deakin et al. 
2018; Spamann 2010; Armour et al. 2009b). Indeed, it has been shown that the lack of theori-
sation of the associations between legal explanatory and economic outcome variables may be 
responsible for a mismatch between theory and empirical research design which makes re-
sults difficult to interpret and compare across studies (Schiehll and Martins 2016). 
We therefore suggest that while the first twenty years of the LFS focused on showing 
empirically that law matters, the next phase in the development of this field of study needs to 
focus on answering the theoretical question of ‘how does law matter?’. Here drawing more 
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systematically on the existing legal theory literature is an important step. This will allow de-
signing more theoretically informed empirical approaches that may produce more robust 
findings, which also contributes to furthering our understanding of the role of law in the 
economy.  
Beyond our literature reviewed, our analysis hints at the importance of theory in the 
social sciences. With statistical and empirical methods becoming more and more sophisti-
cated, it is tempting to succumb to the illusion that sophisticated methods can dispense re-
searchers from proper theory development. Indeed, there may be a tendency in economics 
and other social sciences to consider that the more sophisticated the method, the less care 
needs to go into theorisation of associations (see for the case of randomised control trials 
Deaton and Cartewright 2017). Yet, this is a false believe that leads to inconsistent empiri-
cal strategies in observational settings (see the meta-review by Schiehll and Martins 2016). 
Therefore, we suggest, the third decade of LFS studies should have a core focus on theory 
building around the question of how law matters in addition to empirically testing whether 
law matters. We hope that our analysis of the LFS literature provides promising ways of 
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